James Bond Stockdale 
NATO has been throttling up its efforts in the space domain. In relatively fast order, the alliance has moved from recognizing the growing role of space — developing a formal Space Policy and defining space as an operational domain — to operationalizing NATO’s role in space. This latter stage has focused on efforts to improve the alliance’s space domain awareness and information sharing. The allies have turned NATO’s Space Operations Center into a focal point for allied space coordination, established two initiatives to collect and share space data, and are developing a NATO Space Doctrine that is expected to be published by 2026.
NATO’s progress in the “final frontier” is notable, but insufficient given the degrading security environment, the breakneck speed at which the commercial space industry is evolving, and the high level of interest in space from allies. We believe that the next months will present a critical opportunity to advance NATO’s space mission and we offer five recommendations.
1. Update NATO’s space deterrence and defense policy playbook
NATO should update its 2019 Space Policy to better reflect the current threat environment and to complement the upcoming NATO Space Doctrine. The threat environment remains contested in Europe, on Earth and in space, amid concerns that Russia could put nuclear weapons in orbit or engage in other malicious activities. Additionally, China’s space activities, including the deployment of dual-use satellites with both military and civil applications, remain of concern.
NATO allies should also intensify efforts to develop internal response playbooks to a variety of Article 5 space scenarios and socialize them across the alliance via studies, wargames, and briefings. These playbooks would help map national and international authorities, capabilities, response options, red lines, and differences in allied priorities. The playbooks should explore several particularly thorny space contingencies: NATO’s transition from peacetime to conflict in case of a space-based crisis; NATO’s role in defending allied commercial space assets targeted by adversaries; NATO’s role in individual allied satellite and ground station protection; cross-domain deterrence and escalation; and potential targeting of adversary capabilities in third-party nations in response to an attack.
NATO may further benefit from extending these coordination efforts to select member and non-member states and socialize its thinking when preparing for specific contingencies. For example, NATO exercises could both learn from and reinforce Multinational Force Operation Olympic Defender. Additionally, NATO partners with significant space equities and synergies such as Japan could be invited to assist in exercises and discussions where relevant. These playbooks can help allies become more familiar with each other’s threat perception and develop “space IQ” on how to anticipate and coordinate actions, while maintaining the strategic ambiguity undergirding Article 5. While calls for establishing specific “red lines” against adversary action in space are understandable, we maintain that calculated ambiguity can support deterrence and retain allied sovereign political decision-making.
2. Implement NATO’s Commercial Space Strategy
NATO Assistant Secretary General for Operations Thomas Goffus noted that as a result of the explosion of commercial space capabilities, space is no longer “too expensive, too exquisite, and too classified.” NATO needs to understand how to employ these assets to enhance its military edge. Commercial space capabilities can enable states to satisfy mission requirements more efficiently, at lower cost, with potentially more opportunities for upgrades. NATO recognizes this dynamic. Soon, the alliance plans to publicly release its first Commercial Space Strategy.
While a valuable step in affirming the role of commercial space, the plan’s success will hinge on its strategy, and especially the model NATO develops for its engagement with industry. Past RAND research highlights several recommendations. First, NATO should develop robust partnerships and communication channels with space industry actors. Building on the positive example of SPACENET, a NATO platform for engaging space providers, NATO should continue bringing transparency to its communications and focus on including small- and medium-sized enterprises and non-traditional firms, which represent the backbone of allied defense industries.
Second, NATO should identify, authorize, and resource an institution to oversee engagement with commercial space providers. Currently, responsibilities are split among the NATO Space Operations Center, Space Center of Excellence, and others, which could lead to insufficient coordination.
Third, engagement with industry must be action-oriented to build trust and ownership. Initial conversations should seek ways to ease regulatory burdens that slow acquisition timelines. NATO and industry leaders should share information on the acceptable levels of risk in space operations, and how to build resilience for assured access. The use of commercial space capabilities is as much a cultural shift as a technical one. As Lt. Gen. Michael Guetlein recently said: “In the past, we didn’t believe we could count on our commercial partners and international partners during times of crisis. That has completely changed.” NATO’s Commercial Space Strategy implementation plan presents an opportunity to deepen this engagement and keep up with an industry that changes drastically every six months.
3. Fund the allied space enterprise
NATO allies have very tight budgets dedicated to space within their own military services despite the recent and expected increases in overall defense spending. Further, only around 0.3% of allied defense spending is dedicated specifically to NATO via common funding for items of shared interest such as operational costs, capabilities, and joint facilities. Common funding remains difficult to disburse, and many times requires a nation to “own” the start-up costs of even a jointly approved program. Rather, we suggest the model of project-based funding in support of multinational capability cooperation efforts as an alternative, such as the one established through the Alliance Persistent Surveillance from Space (APSS) program to integrate allied defenses.
EU efforts could also offer an additional source of funding. EU members have finalized the agreement for the SAFE €150 billion loan as part of the broader EU Commission package (ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 Plan) to support the EU’s rearmament. Funding through the loan program could be used to expand and integrate European space capabilities by NATO states, including those who are members of the EU and those, like Norway, Canada, and the U.S., who are not but can participate in SAFE. Additionally, NATO may consider expanding cooperation with the European Space Agency, which is increasingly focusing on dual-use capabilities and redefining its defense role.
4. Develop interoperable space capabilities and effects
Ensuring credible deterrence means fielding appropriate capabilities. For the first time, this year’s NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) cycle will include space requirements for allied militaries. Notably, NATO is also shifting its space capability targets to an effects-based approach for each ally, focusing on quantifying the available “firepower” for allies. NATO should build on that progress by assisting allies to identify areas of joint interest for coordinated space capability development .
Second, allies should consider mainstreaming the multinational capability cooperation format, which allows for common procurement and acquisitions of capabilities in areas of immediate need. Increasingly, NATO is using a model of project-based coalitions to kick-start action in areas of immediate interest — NORTHLINK, STARLIFT, “Project Asgard”, Sky Fortress are positive examples, with APSS arguably the most successful one.
Seeded by Luxembourg with $17.7 million to launch the integration effort that would be available for all 32 allies, the program has now attracted more than $1 billion in allied contributions in the form of data, PED, and cash over the next five years. This model can be mainstreamed for particularly critical space enablers such as Satellite Comms, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, and Command and Control, but also emergent capability areas such as space logistics, or In-Space Manufacturing and Assembly.
To maximize returns on investments, NATO allies should also identify where they can pursue joint, complementary capabilities over sovereign, redundant ones. For example, high-resolution imaging constellations easily fall under the former, whereas satellites used for nuclear command and control will certainly be owned and operated by individual states. Not all space capabilities can be categorized so easily, however, so there is a long list of assets for which discussion is warranted. Relatedly, while European allies are understandably concerned about their overreliance on U.S. defenses and security guarantees, an active effort to complement U.S. space constellations rather than replace them may remind U.S. policymakers of the benefits of allied cooperation in this domain.
5. Reaffirm NATO’s role as a space broker
NATO’s primary value proposition is to serve as a convening space for allies to discuss, debate, coordinate, and align defense activities. NATO leaders often promote global norms that benefit collective defense and strategic stability, such as responsible space behaviors. They may help national policymakers create technical and operational standards for developing and employing military space assets so that allies can invest in indigenous military systems while still maintaining interoperability. NATO can also be a catalyst to streamline intelligence sharing, conduct joint exercises, and facilitate capability development.
We argue that NATO should focus on what it generally does best and apply it to space by serving as a broker for the 32-member alliance across multiple dimensions. NATO should continue bringing its platform to bear in critical areas, such as setting space standards; building the “space IQ” among allied nations and their staff; enabling better coordination and readiness; and wargaming and exercising the space enterprise.
As the role of space grows in NATO’s architecture, a more forward-leaning role for the alliance may also be possible. However, this alternative route is significantly more complex. For example, proposals for “NATO-operated” space architectures are limited by extremely small funds available for pooled resourcing and significant political challenges for maintaining such multinational efforts.
NATO’s space efforts have evolved massively since NATO’s Space Policy was launched five years ago. We believe that by pursuing these five priorities, NATO can continue making progress in this critical domain.
Anca Agachi is the co-Lead of RAND’s Alliances Portfolio in the National Security Research Division, and a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative focusing on NATO issues. Shaan Shaikh is a defense analyst at RAND with expertise in air and missile defense. Retired U.S. Air Force Brig. Gen. Bruce McClintock is a senior policy researcher at RAND, where he leads its Space Enterprise Initiative.
Opinion
C4ISRNet
[crypto-donation-box type=”tabular” show-coin=”all”]
