Off Ramps, On Ramps

By Benjamin Picton, Senior Market Strategist at Rabobank

Markets are in a jubilant mood as Donald Trump announced that Israel and Iran have agreed to a ceasefire to begin within hours. Brent crude prices have fallen by more than 7% at time of writing to $71.48/bbl and US equity indices have finished the day higher across the board. Equity futures in North America and Asia are also pointing higher.

Trump’s announcement followed an Iranian missile strike on the United States’ Al Udeid base in Qatar. The New York Times reports that Iran had provided backchannel notification of the impending retaliation for US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities to Qatar and the United States prior to the attack. That was subsequently confirmed in a ‘Truth’ by Donald Trump who described the Iranian attack as “weak”, but also thanked Iran for issuing the heads up.

Trump subsequently took to Truth Social again to announce the ceasefire agreement which he says will effectively end what he is calling the 12 Day War. An Iranian official has since confirmed that Iran has agreed to the ceasefire, raising hopes that an effective off-ramp has been found and that strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities in Fordow, Natanz and Esfahan will not drag the US into a protracted regime-change effort.

The ceasefire announcement follows earlier reports that Israel was seeking to seize on the success of US strikes and end the war in coming days. Unnamed officials had reportedly told the Times of Israel that Jerusalem was willing to end its bombing campaign if Iran agreed to dismantle its nuclear program. Up until now Iran has remained defiant that it would continue its nuclear program and, critically, its controversial drive to enrich its own uranium. So, is there some agreement to come on the nuclear program, or has this simply been placed in the “too hard” basket for now?

While the US claims to have ‘obliterated’ Iran’s enrichment facilities at Fordow, Natanz and Esfahan, the extent of the destruction is not completely clear and it seems that up to 400kg of uranium already enriched to near weapons grade remains unaccounted for. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said yesterday that Iran’s enrichment program – including the pursuit of nuclear weapons – would continue, and that “other” countries had expressed willingness to supply Iran with warheads.

That might have been pure bluff as Russia, still reeling from the loss of a friendly regime in Syria, seeks to stave off the loss of another friendly regime in central Asia. In (another) post to Truth Social Trump seemed to treat it as such, criticising Medvedev for casual use of the “N word” (nuclear) while making pointed reference to the technological superiority of the US’s nuclear submarines, which had just fired 30 Tomahawk missiles at the Esfahan facility. The subtext was reasonably clear: “you’re not the only one with extensive nuclear capabilities in the region.”

While the Middle East and energy prices seem to be on course to return to something resembling the status quo ante bellum (aside from Iran’s enrichment capabilities, air defences and ballistic missile stocks), the NATO summit today kicks off in the Netherlands with the FT reporting that Poland is upset that Spain has been granted an exemption to the 5% of GDP defence spending target, and that Belgium is set to seek a similar exemption. Poland’s indignation is easy to understand given its shared border with Russian client state Belarus and its plans to get very close to the 5% spending target this year.

The position taken by Spain (and Belgium) underlines some of the inherent contradictions of European collective defence that seem destined to require strengthened supra-national structures to overcome. Chancellor Friedrich Merz seems to understand that Germany – Europe’s largest economy and more geographically Eastern than other big economies – will need to take the lead for collective security to work. 

Merz reiterated yesterday that Europe can no longer “free-ride” on the United States and must step up defence investment to achieve “strategic independence”. That’s all well and good, but as Mark Rutte pointed out to Chatham House last week, Russia currently produces more ammunition in three months than the entire NATO alliance can in a year, and much of the NATO contribution comes from the United States. Ahead of the NATO summit, our European team examines the conditions for success of boosted European defence spending here.

Critically, Europe lacks a shared nuclear deterrent. Emmanuel Macron has recently indicated that he is open to French nuclear weapons being deployed in EU countries to the East, but that they must remain under complete French control. This raises questions about whether a forward-deployed French nuclear deterrent would be a deterrent at all, especially in light of comments that Macron made in 2022 where he said that the French nuclear doctrine was based on the vital interests of France, and that if Russia were to launch a nuclear strike on Ukraine “or in the region”, this would not meet the threshold for the use of French nuclear weapons. Consequently, Merz remains clear-eyed that French nuclear weapons are not a credible substitute for the US nuclear deterrent.

Meanwhile, Aussie Prime Minister Albanese will not be attending the Indo-Pacific partners event at the NATO summit tomorrow. That event features Donald Trump, who Albanese is likely anxious to meet with following a US decision to place the AUKUS program (the centrepiece of Australia’s defence planning) under review. Australia will instead send Deputy PM Richard Marles, who will presumably attempt to secure assurances from Trump that the US really will let Australia buy some of those nuclear submarines that Trump was bragging about on Truth Social overnight. 

That effort may be complicated by news today that Australia will add YouTube to its social media ban for under-16s, an effective non-tariff barrier for US tech that we explore in a new report on Australian economic statecraft. Does sharing the crown jewel of your defence capabilities with allies who resist your wishes on trade, sanctions and defence spending sound very “America First” when you have insufficient supply for your own needs? Perhaps not.