Merz Govt May Use Radical ‘Federal Coercion’ If AfD Party Controls Germany’s Saxony-Anhalt Region

Via Remix News,

The anti-immigration Alternative for Germany (AfD) won the Saxony-Anhalt state election by a wide margin but fell short of an absolute majority. Nevertheless, the party may still come to power if it can garner enough support from BSW or peel off a few MPs from rival parties.

This possibility has thrust an unused and radical clause of the German constitution, federal coercion or “Bundeszwang,” to the center of a fight over how far Berlin can go if the right-wing party takes power.

The AfD took 43.8 percent of the vote in the Sept. 6 election, but the AfD remains three seats short of an absolute majority. However, Ulrich Siegmund, the AfD’s 35-year-old lead candidate, could still become minister-president. The German government has plenty of tools for dealing with Siegmund if he steps out of line.

Germany’s establishment threatens to use “federal coercion” clause

Federal coercion is one of the most radical mechanisms in the German constitution. Article 37 allows the federal government or a representative it appoints to issue binding orders to the states and their agencies. The Federal Republic of Germany has never resorted to this clause before.

Anna-Bettina Kaiser, a law professor at Humboldt University in Berlin, told Deutsche Welle the bar is extremely high.

“The term ‘dramatic’ is most apt here. This is why federal coercion has never been introduced in the history of the Federal Republic – it is treated as a last resort,” she told Deutsche Welle, a state outlet that receives approximately €415 million a year in taxpayer money.

Until now, fights between Berlin and the states have been settled mainly in court.

“It is usually assumed that in the event of a specific legal dispute, the case will go to the Federal Constitutional Court and the given state will comply with the judgment issued by that body,” Kaiser said.

Deutsche Welle reported that an extreme use of Article 37 could include naming a federal representative with power to issue binding orders in specific areas.

“Article 37 actually provides for the appointment of such a representative who has the power to issue binding orders,” Kaiser said.

Any step would have to match the violation and meet constitutional tests. However, Article 37 lists no catalog of penalties. It speaks only of “necessary measures,” leaving the article vague and open to interpretation.

Bundesrat consent would be essential. Under the chamber’s rules, the affected state keeps its vote on Article 37 decisions.

Union parliamentary leader Thorsten Frei has since called Article 37 an option of last resort if an AfD state government acted against the constitution. Social Democratic floor manager Dirk Wiese said it was “good to know” the Basic Law allows constitutional conduct to be compelled by instruction if an “AfD-BSW Putin coalition” installed a far-right politician as premier. The Greens and the Left have not ruled the tool out.

Saxony-Anhalt’s Office for the Protection of the Constitution classifies the state AfD as “confirmed right-wing extremist.”

Cutting funding to an AfD government

On top of the constitutional power that Article 37 offers, the tried-and-tested method of cutting funding is also being discussed and it is not even clear yet if the AfD will be able to assume power in the state.

German officials have also discussed suspending some federal budget transfers to Saxony-Anhalt, which is still dependent on such transfers to prop up its economy. Tagesschau reported that structural funds could be frozen if an AfD government breached EU fundamental rights or rule-of-law conditions.

However, beyond these federal transfers, powerful German Green MEP Daniel Freund said after the vote that the European Commission should, if necessary, withhold money if an AfD-led state government acted against EU principles.

Freund was a notorious foe of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and a longtime advocate of the EU cutting funding to Hungary while his government remained in power. Freund not only succeeded in lobbying the EU to cut funding but this tool is generally seen as one of the primary contributing factors in toppling Orbán from power.

The reality is that this method of cutting or freezing funds has worked remarkably well for the EU, also in the case of Poland’s previous conservative government. When funding is cut, the population suffers, and when they suffer, they punish politicians at the voting booth. Orbán could point the finger all he wanted at Brussels. It did him no good in the end.

If the EU or the German federal government cuts funding, Saxony-Anhalt will suffer, and there is nothing an AfD government can do about it.

For now, it appears for the EU establishment has a virtually fool-proof method for dealing with any voter rebellions or unfavorable democratic results.

A CDU-led federal government also has every incentive to make an example out of a regional AfD-led government. Shortly after the Saxony-Anhalt election, Chancellor Friedrich Merz said Berlin would act if Saxony-Anhalt crossed lines set by the constitutional order.

“If boundaries are crossed there, I assure you that from the federal government’s point of view we will do everything to correct it. The Basic Law also applies in Saxony-Anhalt,” Merz said.

Merz pointed to migration and foreign policy. He also cited the unwritten duty of “federal loyalty.” A state must act loyally towards the standards of the federal state. That covers “the entire immigration and foreigners policy,” he said.

Fact-checkers later noted that Merz did not use the word “federal coercion,” or “Bundeszwang.” Nevertheless, the debate that followed is freely using the term and how it can be applied against the AfD.

The AfD casts itself as a “rule-of-law party”

However, simply winning an election would not, by itself, justify federal coercion. Article 37 of the Basic Law allows the tool only if a state fails to fulfill duties imposed by the constitution or other federal law. The federal government may then, with the consent of the Bundesrat, take the measures needed to compel those duties.

The AfD’s answer has been that it would govern inside the law, and that Berlin is trying to cancel a democratic result.

The morning after the vote, Siegmund again called the AfD a “rule-of-law party,” and said he would act lawfully. He later thanked the Berlin press sarcastically for portraying him as a threat to democracy and said he wanted to “extend a hand” to every actor in the legislature.

AfD co-leader Alice Weidel called the result a mandate to govern, said Merz was the most unpopular chancellor Germany has had and told him his time was up. In the Bundestag she argued that the CDU-SPD coalition had failed. Merz accused her of pushing Siegmund into “electoral fraud” by urging him to hunt for a majority after he had promised to take office only with an absolute majority.

The issue of mass immigration, in the end, always appears to be the real point of contention. According to the European and German establishment, it must continue at all costs. In a 2024 ARD summer interview, co-leader Tino Chrupalla said an AfD-led state would no longer apply the “Königstein key,” which apportions asylum seekers among the states.

“We would no longer go along with that,” he said at the time.

Siegmund has promised “deportations from minute one” and a remigration offensive.

However, a federal government that wants to prove the AfD weak and ineffective is unlikely to allow such a remigration offensive to move forward. There are plenty of tools at its disposal to stymie the AfD and even sabotage its government. Siegmund may be facing a wave of funding cuts, litigation, and ultimately the federal government stepping in and essentially seizing power if he manages to gain power in the state.